A Cause Among Causes? God Acting in the Natural World by Silva, Ignacio
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7/4 (WINTER 2015), PP. 99-114
A CAUSE AMONG CAUSES? 
GOD ACTING IN THE NATURAL WORLD
IGNACIO SILVA
University of Oxford
Abstract. Contemporary debates on divine action tend to focus on finding 
a space in nature where there would be no natural causes, where nature offers 
indeterminacy, openness, and potentiality, to place God’s action. These places 
are found through the natural sciences, in particular quantum mechanics. 
God’s action is then located in those ontological ‘causal-gaps’ offered by certain 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this view, God would determine what 
is left underdetermined in nature without disrupting the laws of nature. These 
contemporary proposals evidence at least two unexamined assumptions, which 
frame the discussion in such a way that they portray God as acting as a secondary 
cause or a ‘cause among causes’. God is somewhat required to act within these 
‘gaps’, binding God to the laws of nature, and placing God’s action at the level of 
secondary causes. I suggest that understanding God’s action, following Thomas 
Aquinas, in terms of primary and secondary causation could help dissolve this 
difficulty. Aquinas moves away from this objection by suggesting to speak of 
an analogical notion of cause, allowing for an analogical understanding of God’s 
causality in nature. With a  radically different understanding of the interplay 
between secondary causes and God, Aquinas manages to avoid conceiving God 
as a cause among causes, keeping the distinctive transcendent character of God’s 
causality safe from objections.
On the face of it, the idea of God acting directly in nature brings 
intellectual challenges both to philosophers and theologians, since it 
would appear to undermine nature’s common course. Nevertheless, 
it seems necessary to formulate an  account on how it is possible to 
understand that nature has its own laws and regular activities together 
with the claim that God can participate actively in the production of 
natural effects. After all, the God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is 
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not a God of the side-lines. Their God is a God who acts in particular 
and special ways in the individual lives of human beings throughout 
history. It is crucial, then, for theologians and philosophers of religion 
to provide believers with an intellectually viable account of divine action 
in the universe.
The dilemma of God’s action in nature could be stated thus: were 
God to intervene in nature, He would be breaking, suspending or simply 
not following the apparent lawful order that He created in the universe, 
which would, at least for some, imply an inconsistency in God’s nature.1 
Furthermore, this situation would seem to threaten the foundations 
of the natural sciences, since it would be impossible to discriminate 
between God’s and nature’s actions. A law-ruled universe, then, does not 
seem to allow for an external agent to act within it.
The change of the century, from 1990 to 2005 more specifically, saw 
the development of the project ‘Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action’, 
co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Centre for Theology 
and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. Scholars taking part in this project 
discussed many innovative proposals concerning God’s action in the 
created universe, most prominently those proposed by Robert Russell 
(among many others, 2006), Thomas Tracy (2012), John Polkinghorne 
(2001a), Arthur Peacocke (1995), Philip Clayton (1997), and Nancey 
Murphy (1995). Their main concern was to explain how God can be 
said to act within nature in ways which would develop history in the 
directions God wants, but without disrupting the lawful natural order. 
In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that most of these scholars 
address the question of these divine acts leaving aside the question of 
miracles. It is not the miracles that Russell, Tracy et al. want to explain, 
but rather how God can be said to guide the universe acting here and 
now in ways which do not disrupt the order of the universe. Thus, the 
notion of ‘special providence’ or ‘special divine action’ was introduced, 
in opposition to general divine action, which refers to the universal 
creation and upholding of the universe (and its lawful order) in existence. 
Special divine action, on the contrary, is a notion meant not to explain 
how God creates and sustains the universe, but rather it was used to 
express ways in which God guides history acting within the very laws of 
nature. Introducing this notion allowed these scholars to think and talk 
about divine action in a world described by the natural sciences without 
1 For example, Taede A. Smedes (2004: 39).
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reference to particular divine interventions within the course of natural 
events, usually referred to as miracles.
The key and novel move in their argument was to find in the current 
scientific theories ‘places’, loci, where to locate God’s action: because 
their goal was to understand and to describe God’s action in the natural 
world in non-intrusive terms, in a  way that is complementary to the 
grain of nature, it was necessary to find real causal gaps in the causal 
order of nature within which God could act. These gaps would allow 
God to interact with creation without disrupting the works of nature, 
without breaking or intervening in its laws. Following the emergence 
of an  indeterministic account of nature given by the development of 
quantum mechanics in the twentieth century, Russell, Tracy, Murphy 
and the others explored the possibility of understanding divine action 
through these indeterminacies. Thus, the indeterminism of quantum 
events offered these scholars the conceptual framework in which to 
place God’s action, without disrupting the natural causal order, but 
determining its outcome nevertheless. Because the very laws of nature 
show that there are events which are open to several distinct outcomes, 
God could simply choose which outcome to determine without breaking 
those laws. This is the programme that Robert Russell named NIODA: 
the search for a non-interventionist, objective, divine action.
In addition to this ‘quantum divine action’ thesis, other proposals have 
also tried to use the non-deterministic character of twentieth-century 
science to offer non-interventionist proposals for divine action: John 
Polkinghorne, for example, has argued for divine action in and through 
chaotic systems, Arthur Peacocke suggested models of top-down divine 
causation, and Philip Clayton held that theories of emergence could be 
regarded as a viable path to think new models of divine action. All these 
different approaches are discussed within the five published volumes of 
the project, and they all deserve careful attention.
I  will take Russell’s quantum divine action thesis as the case study 
of this paper. Even after having received much criticism, Russell still 
holds it, counter-arguing the many objections existing in the literature.2 
I believe, however, that there are some assumptions in his proposal that 
still need careful consideration. In few words, I  contend that this way 
of understanding divine action requires conceiving of God acting as 
natural causes do, a conclusion that not many theologians would want 
2 See, for example, Russell (2006).
102 IGNACIO SILVA
to accept if God’s transcendence is to be maintained. The root of this 
problem lays on the very notion of causality used in the contemporary 
debate on divine action, which I find remains also unexamined. After 
presenting Russell’s proposal in detail and my analysis of it, I  will 
suggest considering the issue through the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
I  want to suggest that his ideas on this topic, in particular his way of 
distinguishing the primary from secondary causes, can shed new light in 
our understanding of God’s acting in the created universe.
I. NIODA AND QUANTUM DIVINE ACTION
Modern science, i.e. science from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth 
century, seemed to picture a purely deterministic universe, which created 
a dilemma for explaining, or even admitting, any kind of special divine 
action: were God to act, God would be breaking the laws of nature. 
Only general providence conceived as the creating and sustaining of 
the universe could be accepted.3 Russell (2007: 202) acknowledges 
this situation and faces it, trying to offer Christians a valid account of 
special divine acts. With the arrival of quantum mechanics by the end 
of nineteenth century, however, modern science was challenged, and 
a conception of a causally open and indeterministic universe began to 
develop, at least in its most fundamental level. This new picture of nature 
meant that the laws which science used to describe the behaviour of 
nature, at least at one level, suggested that nature presented ‘ontological 
causal gaps’ in its commonly regular behaviour.
The dilemma of divine action appeared, then, to be diluted: in 
an  indeterministic universe God could act within nature without 
breaking or suspending any natural law. A description of these special 
divine actions, according to a non-interventionist objective divine action 
account, appeared to be a  plausible theological tenet. Theology could 
once again hold that God acted in the world objectively and that God did 
so without intervening in, breaking, or suspending the laws of nature. In 
Russell’s words (2006: 583):
God’s special objective action is non-interventionist when it brings about 
events which go beyond those described by the laws of nature without 
contravening or disproving them, because natural efficient causality, as 
3 For modern scientists’ views on divine action, see, for example, Peter Harrison 
(1995).
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described by these laws, is created by God ex nihilo, to be insufficient to 
bring these particular events about.
The question, then, is: how does God act through quantum events? 
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen 
interpretation, explains that the key event in a  quantum system, the 
collapse of the wave-function, is of an  indeterministic nature. Russell 
(2006: 591), among many others, accepts this interpretation making 
the additional claim, key for my argument, that the total set of natural 
conditions affecting a quantum process, that is, the total set of conditions 
which science discovers and describes through its equations, is necessary 
but insufficient in principle to determine the precise outcome of the 
process. For Russell (2001: 293), God acts together with nature to 
bring about quantum events, in a way that can be understood as nature 
providing the necessary but insufficient causes, and God complementing 
with His action nature’s insufficiency, in order to constitute the sufficient 
cause of the occurrence of the event. In this account, then, God would act 
purposefully within the on-going natural processes without disrupting 
these processes or violating the laws of nature. In addition, for Russell, 
because no quantum event is fully determined by natural causes, God 
acts in all of them, since the principle of sufficient reason requires that 
there are sufficient causes for each event. On certain occasions, however, 
God will choose to actualise one state in particular, and not the other, 
because that state, and not the other, conveys God’s providence. In this 
manner, God fulfils what nature offers, providentially bringing the future 
which He promised for all creation, acting specifically in all events. God 
acts, then, objectively and directly in and through all quantum events to 
actualise one of the several potential outcomes.
Alvin Plantinga (2011) has lately endorsed a  similar view in his 
latest book. He argues that because of the great challenge that quantum 
mechanics puts against the deterministic view of nature endorsed by most 
modern scientists, theologians do not face a great problem in allowing 
God to interact with nature. The central idea is that God acts within the 
quantum system at the collapse of the wave-function, much like Russell 
suggests. Plantinga, however, holds that the Copenhagen interpretation 
chosen by Russell renders God’s special acts to be too episodic. Instead, 
he favours the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation, which 
allows for collapses to happen besides and beyond measurements. 
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Plantinga explains that on this approach (2011: 116, emphases in the 
original):
[W]e could think of the nature of a  system as dictating that collapses 
occur at the regular rate they in fact display. What is presently of 
significance, however, is that on these approaches there is no cause for 
a given collapse to go to the particular value (the particular position, for 
example) or eigenstate to which in fact it goes. That is, there is no physical 
cause; there is nothing in the previous physical state of the world that 
causes a given collapse to go to the particular eigenstate to which it does 
go. But of course this state of affairs might very well have a nonphysical 
cause. It’s wholly in accord with these theories that, for any collapse 
and the resulting eigenstate, it is God who causes that state to result. 
Perhaps, then, all collapse-outcomes (as we might call them) are caused 
by God. If so, then between collapses, a system evolves according to the 
Schrödinger equation; but when a  collapse occurs, it is divine agency 
that causes the specific collapse-outcome that ensues. On this view of 
God’s special action – call it ‘divine collapse-causation’ (‘DCC’) – God 
is always acting specially, that is, always acting in ways that go beyond 
creation and conservation, thus obviating the problem alleged to lie in 
his sometimes treating the world in hands-off fashion but other times in 
a hands-on way.
The indeterminacy of quantum mechanics is, then both for Russell and 
Plantinga, what offers a  solution to the special divine action problem. 
For them, it is God, a non-physical cause, that fulfils nature to be the 
cause of the collapse of the wave function.
Confronted with the question of God’s causal status in comparison 
to that of natural causes, again both Russell and Plantinga affirm that 
given the ontologically indeterministic interpretation of quantum 
theory, science discovers that there are no sufficient natural (physical) 
causes for the specific quantum events, which implies that God is not 
a natural (physical) cause. If this were the case, Russell (2006) continues, 
God’s action could be discovered by science. Thus, they argue, God is not 
acting as a natural cause and God’s action remains hidden from science: 
where science employs quantum mechanics and philosophy points to 
ontological indeterminism, faith sees God acting with nature to create 
the future. Russell (2006: 587) states: ‘If God acts together with nature 
to produce the event in which a radioactive nucleus decays, God is not 
acting as a natural, efficient cause.’
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II. TWO UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTIONS
I want to argue in this section that the proponents of the quantum divine 
action thesis are ill-assuming that causality entails determinism, and 
that God acting in the world means less autonomy for nature. These two 
assumptions are evidence of the univocity of the notion of cause being 
used in this debate. Hence, the claim that God does not act as a natural 
cause would not hold. In fact, I will argue that there is no other way to 
understand God’s action in the world if one holds that God has to act 
where there’s no natural cause.
First I suggest analysing how the relation between cause and effect is 
understood in this scenario. It seems clear that, from the perspective of 
the quantum divine action thesis, a cause is that which determines the 
outcome of the development of a physical system. Thus, according to this 
interpretation of the causal nexus, the mere existence of an event which 
can be interpreted as a cause requires the existence of an event which 
is interpreted as its effect. Furthermore, the effect cannot be something 
different from what it is, given that the cause is required to cause what it 
is meant to cause, in a deterministic fashion. Most authors involved in 
the context of the debate on divine agency in nature today would, in fact, 
seem to agree with these ideas.
The indeterminism found in the nature of quantum events, thus, 
is not understood in terms of non-deterministic causes, but rather in 
terms of a-causal events. There is a  lack of causality, and hence a  lack 
of determination, in nature. For Russell, Tracy, Murphy, and Plantinga, 
quantum mechanics brings some break in the ontological causal chain 
at the subatomic level of nature. Thus, future events are not caused, 
and hence not determined, by previous natural events. The fact that 
contemporary science now offers a  view of nature in which there can 
be novelty in its development is explained by a  non-causal view of 
causation rather than an indeterministic type of causation. This seems 
clear when both Russell and Plantinga affirm, for example, that nature 
offers insufficient causes for the collapse of the wave function: there are 
no natural causes sufficient to cause quantum events.
My point here is that, even if Russell, Plantinga et al. affirm that the 
dilemma of divine action within a  deterministic universe is broken 
given the indeterministic character of the universe discovered in the 
twentieth-century, the notion of causality assumed in these discussions 
remains a deterministic notion. This stance means, as I will attempt to 
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show in the following pages, that the notion of cause is univocal, which 
in the end will make God to act at the level of natural causes. Russell and 
Murphy, for example, assume this notion when they want to explain why 
it is necessary to admit that God acts in every event which is not fully 
determined by natural causes. They argue that, given the insufficient 
character of nature’s causality, if events are not caused by God’s action 
then they would have no sufficient cause, and hence they could not 
possibly exist.4 Therefore causes, regardless of their physical or non-
physical character, are to be thought of univocally.
Second, I  find that scholars supporting the quantum divine action 
thesis seem to hold that were God able to act whenever and wherever 
God wants within the universe, the autonomy of nature in its actions 
would be endangered. The reason seems to be the following: there is 
a  fundamental incompatibility between the view of God acting in the 
universe here and now and the universe having its own autonomous 
natural causal processes. In defence of the autonomy of the natural 
order and of the existence of real causal connections in that order, God’s 
causal power is restricted. If there is a  natural cause, then God is not 
acting there (and certainly could not be acting there). This notion, again, 
points toward the univocity of the idea of cause being used in the whole 
discourse about quantum divine action.
The urgency to find adequate ways to account for God’s activity in the 
world without denying nature’s proper autonomous processes seems to 
have forced theologians to equate God’s causality with nature’s causality: 
the only way in which God could do something within the natural 
realm is if there is a situation within the natural world that would have 
no cause, i.e. a place where nature does nothing. In these places, hence, 
there would be no autonomous natural action, because there would be 
no action at all. Therefore, were God to act in these, there would be no 
incompatibility between nature’s autonomy and God’s power.
Of course, those who hold the quantum divine action thesis to be 
a  non-interventionist model of divine action, take an  incompatibilist 
view regarding God’s actions and natural causality: where there is 
natural causality, there cannot be special divine causality. In this 
sense, the necessity of explaining the autonomy of nature appears as 
an indication of some reduction in God’s power or activity. If God is to 
act in the universe, then nature should not be acting where and when 
4 Russell (2006: 591); Murphy (1995: 338); Plantinga (2008: 393-395).
107GOD ACTING IN THE NATURAL WORLD
God is to act. God’s causal power, then, is to be restricted to those places 
and moments when nature lacks sufficient causal power. The notion of 
causality assumed in postulating the quantum divine action thesis, then, 
is a univocal notion which implies that a cause is that which determines 
the outcome of an event. Second, this very notion requires that God’s 
causality, at least in regards to special divine actions, should not diminish 
nature’s autonomous actions and integrity.
Given these assumptions, I  argue that the quantum divine action 
thesis renders God to act (specially) as another created cause, or how 
it is commonly expressed, God is forced to act as a cause among causes, 
that is, as a created cause. The first issue to tackle now is the meaning 
of this expression. After all, everyone involved in these debates would 
agree that God is a cause, in at least a similar way in which created things 
are also causes. One should consider here that the objection that God 
is taken to act as a ‘cause-among-causes’ does not want to deny the fact 
that God is a cause, or to affirm that God should not be said to cause. On 
the contrary, this objection means that it is not a good theological move 
to consider God to be acting as secondary/created causes. The objection 
is thus making emphasis on God’s upmost transcendence, stressing that 
when God acts, God is always causing as a primary cause, and never as 
a secondary, created cause. The basic idea behind this objection, then, 
is that God should not be placed at the level of created causes, because 
doing so would mean denying or diminishing God’s transcendence. 
Certainly, this objection is not meant to deny the possibility of God 
acting within the created order of nature as a  cause (for example in 
performing miracles), but to defend God’s non-worldliness.
What the quantum divine action thesis tells us is, ultimately, that 
God is bound by the laws of nature to act in nature. God needs to find 
openings or causal gaps in these laws in order to act, meaning that these 
laws bind God to act according to them. As I  said, it is the univocal 
notion of causality which is assumed in the whole debate about divine 
action that prevents any metaphysical elasticity to distinguish God’s 
causality from natural, created causality. It is precisely because of this 
univocal notion that proponents of this thesis need to find places for 
God to act where there is no created causality. This thesis, in the end, 
requires one cause not to be sufficiently causing in order to have another 
cause complementing that act of causing. It seems evident, then, that 
this thesis considers both the insufficient cause and the complementing 
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cause to be of the same kind, thus acknowledging the univocity of the 
notions of cause and causation.
In this state of affairs I  see two paths to follow: 1) one can accept 
God to be considered as acting as a  cause among causes  – al la John 
Polkinghorne (2001b) in his kenotic considerations, where he affirmed 
that special divine providence is exercised as a cause among causes; or 2) 
one can revise and examine the assumptions. In this respect, one could a) 
revise the scientific data or b) look at the philosophical notions involved 
in the discourse about divine action. It certainly is not the task of the 
philosopher or the theologian to revise the work of the scientists, and 
thus option 2.a should be left out of consideration here. As I expressed 
above, option 1 does not really satisfy the traditional notions of God’s 
transcendence, and the goal of the whole debate on divine action is to 
allow for the traditional transcendent God to act in the created universe: 
the preservation of the traditional notion of God together with the 
full acceptance of contemporary science appears to be the goal of all 
the proponents of the quantum divine action thesis. So I  will follow 
option 2.b, considering some of Thomas Aquinas’ ideas on causation 
and the relation between divine and creaturely, primary and secondary, 
causation, as to portray a picture where God’s and creature’s causalities 
interact in a non-univocal manner.
III. AQUINAS ON GOD AS A CAUSE IN NATURE
Thomas Aquinas dealt with the question of God as a cause in nature in 
several places of his work throughout his life. His main concern was to 
distinguish the causality of the primary cause from that of the secondary 
cause. I have elsewhere presented and analysed in detail his views on the 
relation between primary and secondary causation, so I will introduce 
these ideas only briefly here.5 Aquinas, however, further analyses 
this distinction by affirming that God cannot be considered to act as 
a univocal cause, but rather as an equivocal or analogical causation.
To say that one can distinguish causes analogically means, for Aquinas, 
that one can identify a variety of modes of causing, which would all share 
at least one essential feature. Thus, following Aristotle, Aquinas affirms 
that even if the four causes of material beings (material, formal, efficient, 
5 See my ‘Revisiting Aquinas on Providence and Rising to the Challenge of Divine 
Action in Nature’ (2014).
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and final) are all called causes, they cause in different ways. For Aquinas, 
a cause is always that upon which something depends for its being or 
becoming, but the modes of causality and dependency vary greatly 
depending on the kinds of causes involved. Each of the four different 
causes will cause in a particular way, being, each of them, that upon which 
something depends, though that dependence would be with respect to 
different features of the thing caused. The final cause, which receives the 
name of final because it is the last to be accomplished, is the aim which 
starts and guides the action of the efficient cause or agent. The efficient 
cause is that whose influx or action determines the existence of a new 
being: the effect. It causes by giving a new form in an already existing 
matter. This new form in an already existing matter is what constitutes 
the new being or effect. Thus matter is the subject which receives the 
form from the efficient cause, and the form, which is received in the 
matter, disposes the matter to be this or that different kind of being. In 
this perspective the formal cause explains why something exists as this 
particular kind of thing, and the material cause explains why it can cease 
to be what it is and become something else.
The key point here is that causality is an analogous notion which can 
be employed in a number of ways. A cause is always that upon which 
something depends for its being or becoming, but the modes of causality 
and dependency vary greatly depending on the kinds of causes involved. 
In this manner, God is also said to be that upon which everything depends, 
but not in any similar way to the ways which something depends on 
the four causes. The way in which things depend upon God is, Aquinas 
teaches, in their very being and existence, as I  shall explain below via 
the four moments of God action through secondary causes. God is the 
primary cause of things because what God causes is the very existence 
of all things, without which things simply are not. The first thing, so to 
speak, which is required to do anything is to be. Because of this, the 
secondary cause cannot do anything if it is not by way of the primary 
cause, which brings me to the ways in which Aquinas understands how 
God can be said to act in nature, within the grain of the causal created 
order, and without disrupting this order.
To argue for this position Aquinas makes use of four different ways in 
which something can be said to be the cause of the action of something 
else.6 First, a  (primary) cause can give another (secondary) cause its 
6 See De Pot., q. 3, a. 7.
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power to act. Since every operation consequent to a  certain power 
is also said to belong to the giver of that power, and all power of any 
agent whatsoever is from God, God can be said to cause all the actions 
of nature, because he gives natural things the powers by which they are 
able to act, as from the first principle of all perfection. Second, God may 
be said to be the cause of an action by upholding the natural power in 
its being. God not only gave existence to things when they first began 
to exist, but also gives existence to them as long as they exist. So God is 
also always causing their causal powers. Again, God can be said to be the 
cause of every operation of created causes. I have called these two ways 
founding moments of God’s acting in and through natural agents, while 
I have named the next two ways the dynamic moments.
The third and fourth ways depend on Aquinas’ understanding of 
an  instrumental cause. Aquinas teaches that a  thing is said to cause 
another’s action by moving it to act, as when someone applies the 
causal power of an instrument to action, for example when a man uses 
the knife’s cutting power by applying its sharpness to cutting a  loaf of 
bread or a saw to a piece of timber. For Aquinas, an instrument, when 
acting as an instrument, has two different effects: one which pertains to 
it according to its own nature, and another which pertains to it insofar 
as it is moved by the primary agent and that transcends its own nature. 
Each of these effects refers to each of the two dynamic moments of 
God acting in and through created causes. On the one hand, the first 
of these two ways of causing refers to the first action of an instrumental 
cause. Every agent performs its action according to its own nature and 
powers, moved by God to act, and to achieve its proper effect, in my 
example the cutting of the loaf of bread or the timber. On the other 
hand, the second way of causing the action of the instrument refers to 
the causing of an  effect which goes beyond the power of any created 
cause, in my example, cutting the loaf of bread the shape of a star, for 
the joy of children (which the knife cannot do by its own power). The 
effect that transcends the power of the natural being when being applied 
by God, but which could be attained by participation in God’s power, 
is instantiated being.7 Aquinas adds that this can only happen by the 
immanence of the universal power of God, the primary cause. Therefore, 
since the cause of an action is that by whose power that action is done, if 
one considers the power whereby the action is done, then the power of 
7 See Wippel (2007); and my ‘Revisiting Aquinas’.
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the higher cause, God, is more immediate to the effect than the power of 
the lower cause. In these senses, then, is how Aquinas predicates to God 
that He is a cause in nature.
Even if one can say that God causes in nature, and in affirming this 
one is somewhat acknowledging that God and created causes cause in 
a similar way, i.e. in being that upon which things depend, the way in 
which the word ‘cause’ is predicated of the primary cause, God, is not the 
same as the way it is predicated of natural things. The use of the word 
‘cause’ for God requires some qualification. Following his neo-Platonic 
analysis in his Commentary to the Book of Causes, Aquinas says, as 
I mentioned, that the primary cause is more influential in the effect of 
the secondary cause than the secondary cause itself. Given that the very 
being of the secondary cause is caused by the primary cause, all that the 
secondary cause is, is caused by the primary cause. The secondary cause 
is the real cause of its effect. Nevertheless, properly speaking, the primary 
cause is primarily the cause of the effect of the secondary cause, and then 
the secondary one can also be said to be a cause. Moreover, since the 
secondary cause does not act upon the effect except with the power of 
the primary cause, the effect does not proceed from the secondary cause 
except because of the power of the primary cause. Hence, the power of 
the primary cause, rather than that of the secondary cause, attains firstly 
to the effect.
These features of God’s causality mean, Aquinas argues, that God’s 
causation should not be thought of as a univocal cause, like when an animal 
generates another animal of the same species or when a quantum system 
produces a  quantum event. Rather, Aquinas regards God’s causation 
as analogical causation (or equivocal causation sometimes. It does not 
matter much for my argument which of these options Aquinas preferred 
at his time.) What really matters here is that for him God does not cause 
univocally. As Rudi Te Velde explains, ‘the creature is the same as God 
but differently. While God is his being, the creature only participates in 
being, and thus possesses being’.8 God’s effect falls short with respect to 
the perfection of its cause. The effect receives a diminished and remote 
likeness of God, although there is still an intelligible connection between 
cause and effect. Commenting on these ideas, William Stoeger and 
John Wippel emphasise that Aquinas’ model of primary and secondary 
causes was developed precisely to stress that when one refers to God as 
8 Te Velde (2006: 114). See also, In I Sent, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, co.
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a cause, it is in a way which is unlike any other created cause, in a way 
that transcends what one can say or predicate about God.9
God, then, is said to be the cause of everything’s action inasmuch 
as He gives everything the power to act and preserves that power in 
being (founding moments), and applies it to action inasmuch as by His 
power every other causal power acts (dynamic moments). This doctrine, 
however, should be understood in the sense that the causal powers of 
a  natural thing suffice for being true causes in their own order, while 
requiring divine power to act, since God and the natural agents act on two 
different levels. Here is precisely where Aquinas’ thought distinguishes 
from that of the scholars holding the quantum divine action thesis. The 
same effect, for Aquinas, is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not 
as if God were complementing the lack of causal power in the natural 
cause, or the insufficiency of causality. It is not that part of the effect is 
performed by God and a part by the natural cause. Rather, for Aquinas 
the whole effect proceeds both from God and the natural cause, yet in 
different ways: just as the whole of the one same effect is ascribed to the 
instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent.
Aquinas further argues that the operation of natural causes as 
secondary cause is, in a sense, necessary for God, because, even if God 
could produce the effect without nature, He wishes to act by means of 
nature in order to preserve order in things. It is not that God does not 
have the sufficient power to cause what He causes through natural causes. 
Were God willing to do so, He could. God, however, acts through natural 
causes because of the immensity of His goodness, by which He decides 
to communicate His similitude to things, not only in their existence, 
but also in their being causes of other things. Finally, this providential 
action is to be understood in the terms of the contemporary debate’s 
special providential action, since it is an action which God does willingly 
here and now, when each natural agent acts, at any given time and place. 
Aquinas does not want to give away with the idea that God is involved in 
the actual working of the universe, and offers a complex analysis of the 
relations between the primary and secondary causes, in which the effect 
is produced by both the first and the secondary cause. This account of 
God’s activity in nature helps to explain not only how God is profoundly 
involved in the course of nature, but also to understand the reason nature 
works at all.
9 Stoeger (2008: 232) and Wippel (2000: 117).
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CONCLUSION
My suggestion is that the problems with the quantum divine action thesis 
arise because the debate on special divine action and contemporary 
science, and in particular the quantum divine action thesis, is working 
with a  univocal notion of causality, which prevents any metaphysical 
elasticity to differentiate God’s causality from natural, created, causality. 
Following Aquinas’ analogical use of the notion of cause to refer to God 
and to natural beings, we are able to distinguish different created causes 
from the divine cause.
The quantum divine action thesis proponents, however, by trying to 
engage with the notions of causality which science presents in a univocal, 
loose flexibility to speak about God’s action in the world. In the end, 
this is the ultimate reason for which God is considered to be acting as 
a  natural cause. This is, as I  suggest, a  univocal notion which is both 
applied to God and to creatures, rendering God to act as a cause among 
causes. If the choice is to maintain a  traditional notion of God, then 
I believe that we need to analyse, reflect, and evaluate those unexamined 
philosophical assumptions, in particular those about causality, which 
make it unavoidable to speak of a change in the notion of God.
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